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CYCLICALFLUCTUATIONS IN PROFITS
1. EARNINGS RATES FROM 1919 THROUGH 1928
THIS chapter will examine, in somewhat broad terms and
from a somewhat different point of view, data which are
presented in more specific detail in other parts of the
volume. Our interest here is not in the particular industry
that may be named in the discussion, but in its behavior
along with, or relative to, certain other groups during the
up- and down-swings of the business cycle. The analysis
will be restricted to Manufacturing and its various branches;
nothing will be said of Trade, Mining or Finance. These
three divisions, to be sure, exhibit cyclical variations which
it is important to examine; but the smallness of the Mining
sample (see Ch. 25),andthe fact that in Finance some-
what different accounting procedures are the rule than in
Manufacturing, make it inadvisable to compare these four
in the present chapter. Data for Trade, Mining
and Finance, with a limited discussion of their cyclical char-
acter, will be found in Chapters 21, 25and26.
Considered asa whole, the period 1919—28 indeed
afforded opportunities for profit to many manufacturing
enterprises. Our list of 2,046 large corporations, inall
manufacturing fields together, shows an aggregate net re-
turn of 10.8 per cent upon capitalization for the ten years
in question. Even the severe depression year 1921 did not
[144]CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS [145]
greatly lower this average. If that poor year, 1921,is
eliminated by taking figures for only the years 1922—28,
the return is almost the same, 10.9 per cent.' 'While there
exist no data for other periods with which to compare these
figures, it would seem that, judged absolutely, the series of
profit ratios presented in Chart 8 confirms our general
knowledge that 1919—28 was a prosperous decade (the









PERCENTAGE OF NET INCOME TO CAP ITALIZATION
2,046 CORPORATIONS
ALL MANUFACTURING GROUPS, 1919-28
'The concept of investment here employed, it will be noted,isthat of
capitalization as earlier defined. This assumes, for valid comparison in a
time series, that no substantial alterations in capital structure have taken
place (see Ch. 5). Even apart from this, it would be better from some points
of view to include funded debt as well as stockholders' equity in order to
show the total return on the full investment of capital in an economic sense.
Funded debt figures for this series are not, however, available over more
than the last half of the 1919—28 period and are therefore not used in most
portions of the present analysis. MThile in analyses that seek to determine
the rate of return as between establishments or enterprises of different sizes
(such as appear in Ch. 5), the capital figures employed should preferably
be those which include funded debt (and the income figures, those before
instead of after fixed charges on such debt), for purposes both of time
comparison and of the comparison of different branches of industry over a
1919 1920 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928[146] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
field was even more profitable than Manufacturing, show-
ing an average (aggregate) net return of 13.6 per cent
upon capitalization for the ten years 1919—28 and one of
13.7 per cent for the seven years 1922—28.
But the year-to-year variation in earnings is substantial.
The year 1919 afforded manufacturing industry an 18.3 per
cent return; 1920 saw this reduced to 12.3 per cent, and
the harsh year 1921 cut the figure down to 2.9 per cent.
Recovery came in1922. From that time through 1928
fluctuations in the rate of net income were less severe,
between 9.5and12.4 per cent being earned in every year.
Examining Chart 8 further, it is surprising to note that
the peak of profits,in terms of the rate upon capital,
occurred in 1926 and not in 1928. Clearly, 1928 was a
better year in the stock market, relatively speaking, than
in industry. Not only was 1926 more prosperous for these
2,046 corporations than was 1928; it probably was about
as good a year as 1929. While the data now under discus-
sion do not run beyond 1928, other figures charted later in
this chapter justify this inference.
It will be noted that Chart 8 is drawn to a semi-loga-
rithmic scale, to make possible observation of the relative
year-to-year change in the rate of profits upon investment.
In Chart 9, the same data are shown upon a natural scale,
but in the form of an index with 1927 as the base year.
That 1926 was as prosperous as 1928, or even more
prosperous, can be seen again in the actual percentages of
total profit to total capital enjoyed by the 2,046 individual
ten-year period, one set of figures probably serves almost as well as the
other, if alterations in capital structure are not generally great. That the
difference between the two sets of figures in the aggregate is not large may
be seen by comparing the two ratios for all manufacturing for 1928: net
profits after interest payments on funded debt to invested capital excluding
funded debt, 11.0 per cent; the same before interest charges upon funded
debt to capital including funded debt, 10.4 per cent.CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS [147]
corporations comprising the series. Frequency
affording knowledge of the range of individual



















of the 2,046 companies suffered losses; in 19
cent. In 1926, 33 per cent earned profits at less
cent; in 1928, 38 per cent. Then, jumping to
brackets, in 1926 over one-quarter of the total
per cent or over upon their capitals, whereas in
one-fifth did so.2
The absolute figures for
ment and for dollar volume
2Thedistributions are given in detailin Ch.9. The figures in these
distributions are for total profits upon total capital, i.e., they include funded
debt and the interest thereon. But distributions of the rates of net income
to capitalization would yield about the same results; see Appendix Table 8.
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It will be noted that the rate of growth in sales volume
(the scale is semi-logarithmic)3 exceeds that in capital in-
vestment from 1922 through 1926; thereafter, the reverse
is true. Comparing 1928 and 1923, however, the growth
in the two series is almost exactly the same. Of the relation
between sales and investment something will be said below,
when the analysis of trends in particular industriesis
essayed.
2. RELATION OF PROFITS TO TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCT
One pointinconnection with these aggregate sales
figures commands especial attention. It is often contended
that the cause of an industrial collapse is the increase of
profits at such a rate that the mounting incomes of entre-
preneurs and capitalists, during the period of expansion,
leave a progressively smaller proportion of the total indus-
trial product in the hands of wage earners and other income
receivers. This is admittedly difficult to measure, but some
clue can be obtained from data such as these by taking the
absolute amounts of net incomes of these manufacturing cor-
porations, adding to them the interest paid on bonded debt,
and comparing the growth of those combined figures with
the gross value of the product as represented by total sales
volume.
This is done in Chart It will be observed that while
8Semi-logarithmk,or 'ratio', scales will be used in most of the charts of
this chapter, since interest •inthese data centers more on their relative
changes than in absolute amounts.
4This analysis is based only on the period 1924—28 because funded debt
figures are not available for earlier years. Interest charges were estimated
by assuming an average rate of S per cent on the issues of large industrial
corporations(see Appendix A). The income figures are before Federal
taxes, but the relative differences, were taxes subtracted, would be slight
for this period, and the trend of the series not be
Itisalso true that sales do not represent the entire receipts of these[150] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
total profits, including interest payments to bondholders,
increased somewhat more rapidly than did total volume of
product, as measured by sales, the disparity is not great.
The discrepancy between the increase in the amount of in-
come actually disbursed to security-holders and total sales
indeed looms somewhat larger. It indicates a more liberal
dividend policy towards the peak of the cycle; relatively
less of earnings is 'ploughed back' into industry, at least
less is directly so reinvested.
CHART12
TOTALPROFIT, TOTAL SALES AND TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS
TO SECURITY-HOLDERS
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corporations;non-operating income of various kinds frequently appears as
well. But the aggregate of gross non-operating revenue in manufacturing
as a whole is small in comparison with that received from sales, however
large the former may be in certain individual cases; and unless the ratio
of the one to the other changed very markedly over the period under exami-
nation, sales serve quite as well as would a more refined total gross revenue
figure for purposes of time comparison. Of course, for certain other pur-
poses this might not be so. The question of 'value of products' versus 'value
added'islikewise pertinent; but for the immediate purpose at hand its
discussion does not seem essential. In the flow of money income through
manufacturing industry at least, the volume of sales best represents indus-
try's aggregate product in terms of purchasing power received and passed
on again to the one or the other productive factor. What is not disbursed
tosecurity-ownersor retained in the surplus account is (apart from taxes)
spent for wages, materials, supplies or rentals.CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS [151]
Butthe total net earnings of all capital—the aggregate
of income ploughed back and income disbursed to both
stock- and bondholders—bore no very different relation to
the total product of manufacturing industry in 1928 than
in 1925 or 1926. The bars of Chart 13 show these ratios,
CHART13
TOTAL PROFIT AS A PERCENTAGE OF'SALES,
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thosefor the three years just mentioned standing at about
10 per cent. We shall discuss this matter further in the
concluding section of this chapter.
3. CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS THROUGH 1931
Although itis not possible to' obtain 192'9 and 1930
figures for all of the 2,046 manufacturing companies just
analyzed, a somewhat restricted but still closely representa-
tive sample of that group can be constructed and carried
straight through from 1919 to the end of 1931. This has[152] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
been done by selecting from the list of 2,046 companies,
through an empirical process of trial and error, 71 corpora-
tions in various industries for which the consolidated income
and balance sheet accounts in 1927 and 1928 showed ratios
quite the same as those characterizing the larger group
from which they were drawn. Then, for these 7 1 corpora.
tions, data drawn from other than Government sources
were obtained5 for 1927 through 1931.
In 1927 and 1928 the new figures 'fit' the data for these
years drawn from the original 1919—28 series very closely,
thus justifying the belief that the two series, although
taken from different original sources, are for these two
overlapping years indeed not only comparable but virtually
identical. So far as concerns these 71 companies themselves,
we may beyond question regard the last two years of the
later series as a continuation of the earlier one.°
The only questions remaining before using the 1929—3 1
portion of this 71 companies series, in lieu of data for the
original list of 2,046 concerns from which the 7 1 companies
were selected, are these: how well does the earnings rate
curve for the 71 companies series fit that for the 2,046
See notes in Tables 50 and 52, PP.60—1, ofthe Department of Com-
merce document previously cited.
For 1927, the ratio of net income to capitalization shown for these 71
companies, when data are taken from the original 1919—28 series,is9.6
per cent; when taken from the new 1927—31 series, 10.3 per cent. For 1928
the two figures are 10.4 and 11.4 per cent respectively. (These figures are
all for net income after Federal taxes). This correspondence in ratios is
quite as close when individual major industrial groups are taken in the two
series as for all manufacturing groups together. It is not, as will be pointed
out below, possible to divide these 71 companies into quite as many major
groups as the original 2,046 concerns, since in certain groups too small
numbers would result; but when classified into eight (instead of 11) such
groups, the 'old' and 'new' series respectively show, for 1927, net income
percentages upon invested capital as follows: Foods, 8.4, 9.3; Textiles, 7.6,
9.1; Chemicals, 7.5, 8.0; Metals, 11.2, 11.5; Paper and Printing combined,
23.6, 23.7; Stone and Lumber combined, 8.4, 9.2; Leather and Rubber com-
bined, 6.1, 8.6; Special Manufacturing Industries, 18.5, 18.2.CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS [153]
concerns over
representative
the entire period prior to 1927; and how
industriallyis the smaller list? Chart 14
shows that the two curves follow each other, on the whole,
CHART14









2,046 MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS AND
OF 71 COMPANIES
2,046 CORPORATiONS —— — 7*COMPANIES
A SAMPLE
quite closely; in only one year is there an absolute difference
of much over 2 per cent between the earnings ratios of the
two series.7 The other test, that of
The expression 'per cent' is here used in an absolute sense, i.e.,'2 per
cent' meaning the two points spread between, say, 11.2 per cent and 13.2
per cent. For a discussion of the significance of such differences, and for
their interpretation upon a sliding scale of permissible amounts of dif-
ference, see Ch. 4-3.Hereit may mere1y be said that the amount of dis-
crepancy present, in view of the inaccuracies to which the data are subject,
is not serious(cf.note6,Ch. 7). The only exception tothis statement
occurs in 1922, and could readily have been caused by some dominantly
large concern in one group or the other having enjoyed an inordinately
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
representativeness by[154] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
the relative amounts of capital investment in the different
major groups, is fairly met also. The proportions of total
capitalization shown in each of the various groups cor-
respond fairly well in the sample and the larger list; how-
ever, because of the small number ofcompanies in some
groups, three combinations of groups had tobe effected.8
\Ve have then, in Chart 15, a tested series representing
manufacturing industry from 1919 through For the
CHART15










highprofit in that year. Such a circumstance would have affected the ratio
for the .smaller list of 71 companies far more than for the largerlist of
2,046 concerns. But even here, the discrepancy is not tremendous;the two
figures are 12.1 and 9.1 per cent respectively.
8Thesepercentages for the amount of capitalization in each major group
(in 1927) for the list of 71 companies and for the list of 2,046companies
respectively are as follows: Food, 14.6, 11.1; Textiles, 4.2, 5.2;Chemicals,
24.3, 26.1; Metals, 41.1, 42.8; Paper and Printing, 1.9, 4.9;Stone and Lum-
ber, 4.2, 4.1; Leather and Rubber, 7.8, 3.8; Special ManufacturingIndus-
tries,1.9, 2.0.It should also be said that just as the capital percentages in
Paper and Printing, and Leather and Rubber are somewhat 'off',sois
the earnings ratio in Paper and Printing. For the group in the list of 71
companies (in 1927)itis 23.6 per cent, while for the same two groups
combined in the list of 2,046 companies the figure is only 13.1 per cent.
The 71 companies included have an aggregate capital of $5.3 billionin
1927, which is 22.4 per cent of the aggregate capital of the 2,046 concerns.
191919201921192219231924 19251926192719281929 19301931CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS [155]
thirteen-yearperiod as a whole, the aggregate return was
10.0percent. Taking only the 1921—29 portion of the
period—which gives a 9-year span from the trough of a
serious depression to the crisis in which the 'new era' pros-
perity culminated—the figure becomes 10.9 per cent. Table
32 gives the series divided into eight major manufacturing
groups.
The most surprising thing about these figures, on the
whole, is that no great or sustained upward trend character-
izes them between 1922 and 1929. The period was one of
relative prosperity, to be sure, but in industry (as distin-
guished from the stock market) no generally higher level
of profits was attained during the last few years of the
expansion than during its earlier phases. And the recession
of 1927, commonly viewed as merely a ripple on the sea
of general business prosperity, is seen to have had a more
severe effect upon profits than has been realized. Manufac-
turing industry on the whole earned almost as high a return
in 1930 as in 1927. The 1931 figure, of course, registers a
tremendous drop. It stands at 3.6 per cent, or at almost
exactly the 1921 level. But it is worthy of note that 1927,
regarded generally as a year of very slight recession, was
actually one of scarcely greater profitableness than 1930,
regarded properly as a year of poor business activity and
great unemployment. (The 1932 figure indeed is lower
than 1921—a preliminary computation shows it to be nearly
zero, 0.8 per cent).1°
That the 1931 figure is virtually the exact rate recorded
for 1921 is a rather interesting coincidence. One would
have expected it to be lower. (It is fractionally lower, that
is, 3.6 instead of 3.8 per cent, but this difference is negligible
10This figure rests upon a slightly (but not significantly)different basis
of computation than the 1919—31 figures. See Bulletin NationalBureau





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inview of the character of the data; see note 8.) Economic
conditions in general were worse in 1931; certainly unem-
ployment was greater, and the several indexes of general
business activity all dipped much lower.'1 Yet the average
rate of net income to capitalization earned by large manu-
facturing corporations was virtually the same as in 1921.
This is not, to be sure, true of every manufacturing
group. Some major groups are seen to have made relatively
better showings in 1931 than in 1921 while others appear
in a relatively worse light. Table 33 gives the earnings
TABLE 33
71 COMPANIES SERIES, PERCENTAGE INCOME TO CAPITALIZA-
TION AFTER TAX, BY MAJOR GROUPS
(as relatives on 1927 base)
GROUP RELATIVES
1921 .1927 1928 1931
Foods 58 100 110 113
Textiles 97 100 75 —30
Chemicals 32 100 163 41
Metals 63 100 99 29
Paper and printing 27 100 123 58
Stone and lumber 80 100 108 —1'
Leather and rubber 121 100 29 —56
Special manufacturing industries 29 100 89 23
All groups 40 100 108 38
'Estimated; see Appendix A.
ratesof the groups in several years, expressed as relatives
with the year 1927 taken as 100.
Returning to the composite figures, in which the rate of
return for all manufacturing groups stands at 3.6 per cent
in 1931 as compared with 3.8 per cent in 1921, we may
"For example, the Annalisi index stood at 65.0inNovember, the 1931
low,asagainst 81.6 per cent in March, the 1921 low. The index of the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company in December 1931, stood at
—47.4, whereas in July 1921, it was only —27.4.[158] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
note the relationships prevailing between the general
income curve and the indexes of general business activity.
Chart 16 presents three series of relative or index figures.
The curve showing by far the largest fluctuations is that for
RELATIVES
CHART16






COMPANIES AND FOR ANNALIST AND A.T. AND T.
1927100
the rate of net income. The two business activity series
the Annalist and American Telephone and Telegraph Ccm
pany indexes, converted into relatives with the same base as
that of all the net income series, the year 1927 being taken
as 100 in all three series.
The index of corporate net income, or rather of the rate
of return for large corporations in Manufacturing indus-
tries, is seen to fluctuate from about 140 to 40, while the
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areCYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS [159]
about107 or 104 to about 70 or 60 respectively. In other
words, the amplitude of the extreme swing is roughly twice
as great in the rate of net corporate incomes as in general
business activity.
In closing this chapter, we revert to a point made earlier.
This last series of figures, like a preceding one that was ex-
arnined, fails to show any continuous increase in the earn-
ings rates of large corporations 12duringthe five years
leading up to the 1929—30 collapse. The data thus do not
lend support to explanations of recession that hold that
cumulatively increasing profit rates in industry at large are
the fundamental cause of general overexpansion, eventual
crisis and subsequent liquidation. If anything, closer exam-
ination of the figures suggests that the collapse of 1929 was
not caused principally by generally high earnings rates pre-
vailing in the period immediately preceding.13
It has been remarked that the curve for all manufactur-
ing fell about as iow in 1927 as in 1930. It is also true that
it stood as high in 1926 as in 1929. This is likewise true of
the showing of most of the major groups themselves. The
rate of return in Met
in 1929. The same is
sole exception of Pap
quacy of the sample is
Most of the series, it
swing whatever in the
ing the three or four
than during the three
Observe carefully
for1926 and 1927;
als was virtually as high in 1926 as
true in every other group with the
er and Printing; and here the ade-
somewhat questionable (see note 9).
may be repeated, show no sharp up-
rate of profits upon investment dur-
years ending in 1929; no more so
or four years prior to 1926.
the data for Metals and Chemicals
and again for 1929 and 1930. Ex-
That is, in terms of their ratio to investment, which is the proper way
to measure the profitableness of industry. In absolute amounts, of course,
profits increased greatly.
Cf.Gordon Hayes, Profits Destroy Prosperity, Ne'w Rej5ublic, June 3,
1931,pp.67—9.[160] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
amine the Food figures; then turn back to the curve for All
Manufacturing (Chart 15). The declines in the important
Metals and Chemicals groups are about as severe between
1926 and 1927 as from 1929 to 1930. In Foods, also an
important group, a decline occurred in 1927, but none in
1930. In All Manufacturing together the 1926—27 decline
is from 13.3 to 9.6 per cent while that in 1929—30 is from
13.2 to but 8.3 per cent—a difference not at all striking.
Why, then, did not 1927 turn into a year of pronounced
recession such as 1930; or 1928 become a year of deep
depression such as 1921 or 1931? Certainly the answer is
not that the profits situation was essentially different in
1928—29 from that in 1925—26. As a matter of fact, aggre-
gate earnings upon investment for the three years 1924—26,
for All Manufacturing, actually stand at a higher level than
do those of the three years 1927—29. If 'profits destroyed
prosperity' in 1929, as has been said, they should have done
so equally in 1926.
But to say that generally high earnings in industry (or
even in large major groups of industries) exerted no causa-
tive influence upon the cessation of prosperity does not mean
that the large net incomes enjoyed by particular branches of
manufacturing may not have resulted in an overexpansion
of investment in those specific industries during the years
1927—29, and thus contributed to bring about a general
collapse. To examine the evidence for or against this some-
what different point, we may next, returning to the data for
the 2,046 companies from 1919—28, analyze the rates of
earnings and the growth of capital in 73 sub-branches of the
several major groups just discussed.